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1 Introduction
We study the inclusion problem
0 ∈ R(x) + ∂ f0(x) (1)
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where π ∈ R(x) iff there exist πj ∈ X, αj ∈ R such that π = ∑mj=1 πj, πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx)
and −〈x, πj
〉 − φ j(x) ∈ ∂ ind≥0(αj). j : K → 2R+ stands for a multivalued mapping
given by
αj ∈ j(x) =
{
βj ∈ R+ : ∃τ j ∈ ∂ fj(βjx) such that −
〈
x, τ j
〉 − φ j(x) ∈ ∂ ind≥0(βj)
}
j = 1, . . . , m. HereK ⊂ X is a closed convex cone in a reflexive Banach space X, X
is the dual of X , K ⊂ X is the negative polar cone of K. It is worth pointing out
that we do not require the cone K having nonempty interior.
The following assumptions will be needed throughout the paper: fj : X →
R ∪ {+∞}, j = 0, 1, . . . , m, are convex, lower semicontinuous functions such that
Dom( f0) ⊂ K and Dom( f j ) ⊂ K, j = 1, . . . , m, while φ j : K → R+, j = 1, . . . , m, are
continuous, nonnegative valued functions on K. “∂” stands for the subdifferential
operator in the sense of Convex Analysis, ind≥0 : R → R ∪ {+∞} is the indicator
function of the segment [0,+∞). A symbol “Dom” is used to denote the effective
domain of the corresponding function, R+ = {t ∈ R : t ≥ 0}.
The problem (1) can be reformulated to the system of subdifferential inclusions
πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx), j = 1, . . . , m
−∑mj=1 πj ∈ ∂ f0(x)
−〈x, πj





with the unknowns x ∈ K, (πj) ∈ (K)m, (αj) ∈ Rm+ to be found. In what follows, it will
be referred to as the economic equilibrium type problem. Our main result on this
issue can be formulated as follows.
Theorem 1 Assume that for each j = 1, . . . , m the hypotheses below hold:
(H1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j )) and ∀ y ∈ K \ {0} ∃β ≥ 0: βy ∈ Int(Dom( fj))
(H′2) ∃ ρ j > 0, ∃Mj > 0 :
{
τ ∈ K : 〈∂ f j (τ )τ 〉 ∩ (R− + ρ j) = ∅
} ⊂ B(0, Mj)
(H′3) φ j(x) ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ K
(H4) ∂ fj(0) is locally compact
(H5) φ j : K → R+ is weakly continuous on K
(H′6) ∃ ρ > 0, ∃M > 0 : {y ∈ K : f0(y) ≤
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) + f0(0) + ρ} ⊂ B(0, M)
(H7)
(−∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0)
) ∩ ∂ f0(0) = ∅
(H9) f ∞j (y) + φ j(y) > 0, ∀ y ∈ K.
Then there exist disjoint sets J, J0 ⊂ {1, . . . , m} with J ∪ J0 = {1, . . . , m} and x ∈ K \ 0,
(πj) ∈ (K)m, (αj) j∈J ∈ Int(R+)|J|, (αj) j∈J0 = 0 ∈ (R+)|J0|, such that
πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx),
〈
x, πj
〉 + φ j(x) = 0, j ∈ J
πj ∈ ∂ fj(0),
〈
x, πj
〉 + φ j(x) ≥ 0, j ∈ J0
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Two types of applications of the aforementioned theorem will be presented in this
paper:
– first, applications related to economic equilibrium problems,
– second, applications related to a class of multiobjective optimization problems
with, what will be called here, “budget-like” constraints.
If φ j ≥ 0 j = 1, . . . , m, are convex, positive homogeneous functions and f0(y) =∑m
j=1 φ j(y), y ∈ K, then (2) can be seen as the variational formulation of the
Arrow–Debreu model of economic equilibrium. This formulation has been intro-





, y ∈ X,  ⊂ X being a convex, closed, nonempty set of
K, characterizes the total budget function while f j (the conjugate of fj) and φ j
are dis-utility and budget functions corresponding to j’s consumer, respectively.
−πj ∈ −K, j = 1, . . . , m, are the commodity bundles related to j’s consumer and
x ∈ K represents the price vector.
Indeed, if αj > 0, j = 1, . . . , m, then (2) ensures (x, (πj)) ∈ K × (K)m to be a
solution of the problem
f j (πj) = inf
{
f j (τ ) : −
〈
x, τ
〉 ≤ φ j(x) and τ ∈ K
}







i.e., (x, (πj)) is the Walrasian Equilibrium for the corresponding economic equilib-
rium problem (cf. [28]). There are numerous literature references related to general
equilibrium problem. For this issue we refer the reader to [1–6, 14–16, 19, 22, 24, 26–
29, 33, 36–39, 45, 46] and the references therein.
Our main result related to the economic equilibrium issues generalizes that of [34]
where X has been assumed to be separable. It reads as follows.
Theorem 2 Let X be a ref lexive Banach space and K be normal. Moreover, assume
that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m} the hypotheses below hold:
(H′1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j ))
(H′′′3 ) ∃γ > 0 :
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) ≥ γ ‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K
(H4) ∂ f j(0) is locally compact
(H′7)
(−∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0)
) ∩  = ∅
(H′8) ∃C > 0 :  ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C)
(H′9) φ j(y) + f ∞j (y) > 0 ∀ y ∈ K \ {0}




) ∈ K × (K)m × (R+)m, ‖x‖ = 1, and r ∈ (0, 1] such that
πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx), j = 1, . . . , m
−∑mj=1 πj ∈ r∂ f0(x)
−〈x, πj




Note that x is then a solution of the inclusion
0 ∈ R(x) + r∂ f0(x).
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Concerning the second group of applications related to multiobjective optimiza-
tion issues we replace fj by f
β





, y ∈ X, β = (βj) ∈ Int(Rm+) and obtain the






























j = 1, . . . , m.
Next, we show that the multivalued mapping (β) = {αβ} with nonconvex values
















fj(y) + f0(y) ∀y ∈ K
−〈xβ, πβj
〉 − φ j
(
xβ





Therefore we are allowed to conclude that a multiobjective optimization problem
related to the vector objective ( f0, f1, . . . , fm) possesses at least one Pareto optimal
solution fulfilling the “budget-like” constraints (4)2.
Our result extends those obtained in [35] and reads as follows.
Theorem 3 Assume that K is normal and f0(y) = ∑mj=1 φ j(y), y ∈ K, where φ j(·)
are convex, lower semicontinuous, positive homogeneous, nonnegative valued. Sup-
pose that for each j = 1, . . . , m the hypotheses below hold:
(H′1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j ))
(H′′3 ) ∃γ j > 0 : φ j(y) ≥ γ j‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K
(H′8) ∃C > 0 :  ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C)
(H13) ∃G > 0 : ∑mj=1 φ j(y) ≤ G‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K.
Moreover, let one of the two assumptions below hold:







< 0, j = 1, . . . , m.
Then there exist (xβ, (πβj ), (βj)) such that (4) holds.
There is a vast literature on multiobjective optimization problems. We refer to
[10, 11, 13, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 30–32, 40, 44, 47–50] (see also [1, 28]) for a variety
approaches, results and discussion.
2 Preliminaries
Let X be a reflexive Banach space with its dual X. The pairing over X × X will
be denoted by
〈·, ·〉. Assume fj : X → R ∪ {+∞}, j = 0, 1, . . . , m, to be convex, lower
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semicontinuous, proper functions. Their conjugates in the sense of Convex Analy-
sis will be denoted by f j : X → R ∪ {+∞}, respectively. Moreover, assume that
there exists a closed, convex cone K ⊂ X such that Dom( f0) ⊂ K, Dom( f j ) ⊂ K,
j = 1, . . . , m, where K = {τ ∈ X : 〈y, τ 〉 ≤ 0 ∀ y ∈ K} is the negative polar cone of
K. In the presented approach we do not assume that K has nonempty interior. Let
φ j : K → R+, j = 1, . . . , m, be continuous functions on K with nonnegative values.







v xj : = inf
{
f j (τ ) + ind≤φ j(x)(Axτ) : τ ∈ X
}
, j = 1, . . . , m,





, τ ∈ X, (5)
and ind≤φ j(x) stands for the indicator of {t ∈ R : t ≤ φ j(x)}. It is easy to check that the
adjoint of Ax takes the form Axα = −α x, α ∈ R, and the conjugate of ind≤φ j(x) is
given by ind≤φ j(π)(α) = αφ j(x) + indR+(α), α ∈ R. According to the Fenchel duality







v xj : = inf
{
fj(α x) + αφ j(x) + ind≥0(α) : α ∈ R
}
, j = 1, . . . , m.
From the Fenchel duality theory we get the result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that for any j = 1, . . . , m the assumptions below hold:
(H1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j )) and ∀ y ∈ K \ {0} ∃β ≥ 0: βy ∈ Int(Dom( fj))
(H2) ∃Mj > 0 :
{
τ ∈ K : 〈∂ f j (τ )τ 〉 ∩ R− = ∅
} ⊂ B(0, Mj)
(H3) ∃δ j > 0 : φ j(x) ≥ δ j ∀ x ∈ K.







π xj ∈ K and αxj ≥ 0, respectively, which are interrelated by














⇔ αxj ∈ ∂ ind≤0
(
−〈x, π xj
〉 − φ j(x)
)
(7)
v xj + v xj = 0. (8)
Moreover, if we def ine j : K → 2R+ by
j(x) =
{{
βj ∈ R : ∃τ j ∈ ∂ fj(βjx) with −
〈
x, τ j
〉 − φ j(x) ∈ ∂ ind≥0(βj)
}
x ∈ K \ 0
0 x = 0,
j = 1, . . . , m, then the graph of multivalued mapping j is closed and j has nonempty,
bounded, closed and convex values.
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Proof This is an easy task to check that for x ∈ K \ {0}, (H1) implies
0 ∈ Int[Ax Dom
(
f j
) − Dom (ind≤φ j(x)
)]
and
0 ∈ Int[Ax Dom
(
ind≤φ j(x)
) + Dom( fj)],
which due to the theorem of Fenchel [42] (see also [7]) there exist π xj ∈ K and αxj ≥ 0
such that (6), (7) and (8) hold. Accordingly, we conclude that for any x ∈ K \ {0},
j(x) is non empty because αxj ∈ j(x).








) + φ j(x)
(
t − αxj
) ≥ 0, ∀ t ≥ 0, (9)




, t ≥ 0. Thus, it is a
convex and closed set (see [17]).
Now we claim that j(x), x ∈ K \ {0} is bounded. To show this let αxj ∈ j(x). From




〉 ∈ 〈∂ f j (π xj ), π xj
〉
.
Due to (H2) this yields ‖π xj ‖ ≤ Mj for some Mj > 0. This fact, by the lower semicon-
tinuity and convexity of f j , implies
f j (π
x
j ) ≥ −a j‖π xj ‖ − b j ≥ −a jMj − b j := −m j, for some a j, b j ≥ 0. (10)
Since −〈x, π xj




〉 = αxj φ j(x), (11)
which in view of αxj x ∈ ∂ f j (π xj ) implies




, ∀τ ∈ Dom( f j ). (12)
Now, on the contrary, suppose that  j(x) is unbounded. There exists a sequence
{αnj } ⊂ j(x) with αnj → ∞ as n → ∞ and such that




f j (τ ) + ‖τ‖ ‖x‖, ∀τ ∈ Dom( f j ).
Letting n → ∞ yields
φ j(x) ≤ ‖τ‖ ‖x‖, ∀τ ∈ Dom( f j ).
Since 0 is a cluster point of Dom( f j ) (due to (H1)), one obtains φ j(x) ≤ 0, contrary
to (H3). The boundedness of j(x) has been established.
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Now let us notice that for sufficiently small  > 0 the condition ‖x‖ ≤  implies
−〈x, π xj
〉 ≤ ‖x‖‖π xj ‖ ≤ Mj < δ j ≤ φ j(x). Thus by (11) we deduce that αxj = 0. There-
fore in some neighborhood of 0 inK, say O(0), we have j(x) = {0} for any x ∈ O(0),
which means that j : K → 2R+ is continuous at 0 ∈ K.
In order to establish the closedness of the graph of j(·) on K × R+ it remains to
check whether from the assumptions: {xn} ⊂ K, αnj ∈ j(xn), xn → x in X, αnj → αj
in R for some x ∈ K, x = 0, and αj ∈ R+, respectively, one can deduce that αj ∈
j(x).











But the left hand side of this inclusion is non-positive. Therefore, by (H2), {πnj } is
bounded. Consequently, one can suppose that πnj ⇀ π

j weakly in X
 for some πj ∈
K (by passing to a subsequence, if necessary). Taking into account the conditions
αnj x





〉 − φ j
(
xn





we are allowed to pass to the limit as n → ∞. By the continuity of φ j(·), the maximal
monotonicity of ∂ f j (·) and ∂ ind≥0(·), we get
−αj x ∈ ∂ f j (πj )
−〈x, πj
〉 − φ j(x) ∈ ∂ ind≥0(αj )
from which it follows αj ∈ j(x), as desired. The proof is complete. unionsq











〉 − φ j(x) ∈ ∂ ind≥0(αj), j = 1, . . . , m
}
, x ∈ K. (13)
Note thatR(·) is not monotone due to the dependence of j on x.
Proposition 2 Under the assumptions of Proposition 1,R given by (13) is a uniformly
bounded multivalued mapping with nonempty, convex, closed values.
Proof To begin with let us notice that if τ ∈ R(y), τ ∈ K, then τ = ∑mj=1 τ j with
τ j ∈ ∂ fj(βjy) and βj ∈ j(y). Hence
〈




〉 ≤ 0 which by (H2) implies
‖τ j‖ ≤ Mj. Consequently, ‖τ‖ ≤ ∑mj=1 Mj. The boundedness ofR follows.
424 Z. Naniewicz
Next we show that ∂ fj(α1x) = ∂ fj(α2x) for any α1, α2 ∈ j(x), x ∈ K. To this end,
assume that π˜1, π˜2 ∈ ∂ fj(j(x)x). There exist α1, α2 ∈ j(x) with the property that
π˜1 ∈ ∂ fj(α1x) and π˜2 ∈ ∂ fj(α2x).










) = f j
(
π˜2



















〉 + φ j(x)
) = 0, n = 1, 2.
Case 1 α1, α2 > 0.
Taking into account that αnx ∈ ∂ f j (π˜n), n = 1, 2, we obtain
−〈αnx, τ − π˜n
〉 + f j (τ ) − f j
(
π˜n
) ≥ 0, ∀ τ ∈ K, n = 1, 2.
Since in such a case
〈
x, π˜n
〉 + φ j(x) = 0, n = 1, 2, we conclude that
〈
x, π˜t
〉 + φ j(x) = 0,
and consequently
−〈αnx, τ − π˜t
〉 + f j (τ ) − f j
(
π˜t
) ≥ 0, ∀ τ ∈ K, n = 1, 2.
Hence, by adding these inequalities multiplied by t and 1 − t, t ∈ [0, 1], respec-
tively, we easily arrive at
−〈αt x, τ − π˜t
〉 + f j (τ ) − f j
(
π˜t
) ≥ 0, ∀ τ ∈ K,
where αt : = tα1 + (1 − t)α2. Hence αt x ∈ ∂ f j (π˜t) for any t, t ∈ [0, 1] which is
equivalent to π˜t ∈ ∂ fj(αt x). But this means that ∂ fj(α x) does not depend on the
choice of α ∈ j(x), as claimed.
Case 2 α1 = 0, α2 > 0.
In this case we have
π˜1 ∈ ∂ fj(0) and π˜2 ∈ ∂ fj(α2x),
and
−〈x, π˜1
〉 − φ j(x) ≤ 0,
〈
x, π˜2
〉 + φ j(x) = 0.
From the monotonicity of ∂ fj(·) it follows
〈






〉 ≥ 〈α2x, π˜1
〉
and consequently, −〈x, π˜1
〉 = φ j(x). Thus we have arrived at the case considered
previously. The assertion follows.
To complete the proof it remains to invoke the well known properties of maximal
monotone mappings ∂ fj(·) and combine them with the properties of j(·) mentioned
in Proposition 1. unionsq
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3 Pseudo-Monotonicity of R
Let us recall some definitions and properties of the theory of monotone type
mappings.
Definition 1 [12] An operator T : K → 2X is said to be pseudo-monotone from K
into 2X

if the following conditions hold:
(1) For any x ∈ K, T(x) is nonempty, bounded, closed and convex;
(2) T is upper semicontinuous from each F ∩K (F - finite dimensional subspace of
X) to the weak topology of X;




xn − x, τ n〉 ≤ 0




xn − y, τ n〉 ≥ 〈x − y, τ (y)〉.
Now we are ready to discuss the pseudo-monotone properties ofR.
Proposition 3 Suppose that for any j ∈ {1, . . . , m} the following conditions hold:
(H1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j )) and ∀ y ∈ K \ {0} ∃β ≥ 0: βy ∈ Int(Dom( fj))
(H2) ∃Mj > 0 :
{
τ ∈ K : 〈∂ f j (τ ), τ
〉 ∩ R− = ∅
} ⊂ B(0, Mj)
(H3) ∃δ j > 0 : φ j(x) ≥ δ j ∀ x ∈ K
(H4) ∂ fj(0) is locally compact
(H5) φ j : K → R+ is weakly continuous on K.
ThenR : K → 2X is a pseudo-monotone mapping on K.
Proof In order to show that R is pseudo-monotone on K we have to check that
(1)–(3) of Definition 1 hold.
(1) See Proposition 2.




xn − x, πn〉 ≤ 0. (14)
Our task is to show that for each y ∈ K there exists an element π(y) ∈ X such that




xn − y, πn〉 ≥ 〈x − y, π(y)〉. (16)













(or equivalently: αnj x
n ∈ ∂ f j (πnj )), where αnj ∈ j(xn). By the definition of j,
−〈xn, πnj
〉 − φ j
(
xn





As it has been already shown, (H2) implies the boundedness of {πnj }∞n=1 ⊂ K, namely‖πnj ‖ ≤ Mj, j = 1, . . . , m. For the boundedness of {αnj } ⊂ R+ we proceed like in the





















If αnj → ∞ then we are led to the contradiction. Indeed, by using the weak continuity
of φ j and boundedness of {‖x‖n}, ‖xn‖ ≤ C, it follows





By (H1), 0 is a cluster point of Dom( f j ) which implies φ j(x) ≤ 0, contrary to (H3).
The assertion follows.
Therefore, without loss of generality it can be assumed that
πnj ⇀ πj weakly in X
 as n → ∞ (21)
αnj → αj in R as n → ∞ (22)





























〉 ≥ 〈αjx, πj
〉
. (24)





〉 ≥ 〈x, πj
〉
. (25)
Indeed, if αj > 0, the assertion can be deduced directly from (24). If αj = 0 then
αnj x
n → 0 strongly in X. Hence, by the maximal monotonicity of ∂ fj, πj ∈ ∂ fj(0). Since
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∂ fj is monotone, we have
〈
αnj x
n, πnj − πj
〉 ≥ 0. It immediately implies (25) provided
that αnj > 0 (for infinitely many n). If α
n
j = 0 for any n then πnj ∈ ∂ fj(0) which by
(H4) implies that πnj → πj strongly in X. Hence
〈
xn, πnj
〉 → 〈x, πj
〉
as n → ∞ and
(25) follows.





〉 = 〈x, πj
〉





xn − y, πn〉 = 〈x − y, π 〉
for every y ∈ X, where π = ∑mj=1 πj, i.e. (16) holds with π(y) := π .
Now we assert that π ∈ R(x), or equivalently,
αjx ∈ ∂ f j (πj), ∀ j = 1, . . . , m (27)
−〈x, πj
〉 − φ j(x) ∈ ∂ ind≥0(αj), ∀ j = 1, . . . , m. (28)
For (27) we need (18). Namely, taking into account that αnj x
n ⇀ αjx and πnj ⇀ πj





n − αjx, πnj
〉 ≤ 0. (29)
Hence the maximal monotonicity of ∂ f j yields (27).
In order to complete the proof we have to show (28). This in view of (26) and
(H5) can be easily deduced by passing to the limit as n → ∞ in (19). The proof of
condition (2) in the definition of pseudo-monotonicity is complete.
(2) Suppose that xn → x in F ∩K, F being the finite dimensional subspace of X,
πn ∈ R(xn). Since R is uniformly bounded, {πn} is bounded and therefore (14)
is fulfilled. As in (3) we show that every weak limit of {πn} lies in R(x). This
ensures the desired upper semicontinuity.
The proof of Proposition 3 is complete. unionsq
4 Existence Results
Consider the problem of finding x ∈ K such that for a certain π ∈ R(x) the following
variational inequality holds:
〈y − x, π〉 + f0(y) − f0(x) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ K. (30)
Recall that Dom f0 ⊂ K. Thus this problem can be written equivalently as
0 ∈ R(x) + ∂ f0(x). (31)
The important point to note here is the fact that both K and K are allowed to
have empty interiors. The reason is that we are going to use the theory of generalized
pseudo-monotone mappings developed by Browder–Hess in [12, pp. 288–293]. In this
theory the corresponding cone having internal points is not required.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that for any j = 1, . . . , m the assumptions below are fulf illed:
(H1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j )) and ∀ y ∈ K \ {0} ∃β ≥ 0: βy ∈ Int(Dom( fj))
(H2) ∃Mj :
{
τ ∈ K : 〈∂ f j (τ ), τ
〉 ∩ R− = ∅
} ⊂ B(0, Mj)
(H3) ∃δ j > 0 : φ j(x) ≥ δ j ∀ x ∈ K
(H4) ∂ fj(0) is locally compact
(H5) φ j : K → R+ is weakly continuous on K
(H6) ∃y0 ∈ Dom( f0), ∃M > 0 : {y ∈ K : f0(y) ≤ ∑mj=1 φ j(y) + f0(y0)} ⊂ B(0, M).
Then the problem: Find x ∈ K such that
0 ∈ ∂ f0(x) +R(x) (32)
admits at least one solution. Equivalently, there exists (x, (πj), (αj)) ∈ K × (K)m ×
(R+)m such that
πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx)
−
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ ∂ f0(x)
−〈x, πj





Proof Introduce the duality mapping J : X → 2X by J(y) = {τ ∈ X : 〈y, τ 〉 =
‖τ‖ ‖y‖, ‖y‖ = ‖τ‖} (cf. [12], p. 280). Recall that J(·) = ∂( 12‖·‖2).
For a maximal monotone mapping T : X → 2X define its Yosida approximation
Tλ : X → 2X , λ > 0, by Tλ : =
(
T−1 + λJ−1)−1. It is well known that for any λ > 0,
Tλ is a maximal monotone, bounded operator with Dom Tλ = X. Thus it is pseudo-
monotone on X (cf. [12], Proposition 8, p. 266).
Now, let us set T = ∂ f0 and Tλ = (∂ f0)λ. Proceeding like in the proof of ([12],
Proposition 9, p. 267) we ensure that R+ (∂ f0)λ is a pseudo-monotone mapping on
K for any λ > 0. Thus applying ([12], Theorem 15, p. 289) we deduce the existence
of xλ ∈ B(0, 2M) ∩K such that
〈
y − xλ,R(xλ) + (∂ f0)λ(xλ)
〉 ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ K ∩ B(0, 2M), (34)
with M as in (H6). Thus there exist πλj ∈ K ∩ B(0, Mj), τλ ∈ (∂ f0)λ(xλ) and zλ ∈ X
with the properties that
m∑
j=1








≥ 0, ∀y ∈ K ∩ B(0, 2M). (35)
By the definition of J it follows
〈
xλ − zλ, λτλ〉 = ‖xλ − zλ‖‖λτλ‖, ‖λτλ‖ = ‖xλ − zλ‖.








≥ 〈xλ − zλ, τ λ〉 + 〈zλ − y0, τ λ
〉
,
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Taking into account that f0(zλ) ≥ −a‖zλ‖ − b for some a, b > 0 ( f0 is proper, lower











⎭ + f0(y0) + 2aM ≥
‖xλ − zλ‖2
λ
− a‖xλ − zλ‖
for some constant C > 0. Thus ‖xλ − zλ‖ → 0 as λ → 0. Since {xλ} ⊂ B(0, 2M) ∩K
andR is uniformly bounded, one can extract a sequence λn → 0 such that





j weakly in X
 as n → ∞,
















from which, by the weak lower semicontinuity of f0, it follows













Now applying the pseudo-monotonicity ofR yields
m∑
j=1










Finally, for any y ∈ B(0, 2M) ∩K ∩ Dom( f0), from (35) we obtain
0 ≤
〈
















+ 〈y − zλn , τ λn 〉 + 〈zλn − xλn , τ λn 〉
≤
〈



































+ f0(y) − f0(x) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ B(0, 2M) ∩K. (36)




φ j(x) + f0(y0),
which thanks to (H6) implies ‖x‖ ≤ M. Having in mind the validity of (36) for any
y ∈ B(0, 2M) ∩K, we easily deduce (32). The proof is complete. unionsq
The problem (33) will be referred to as the economic equilibrium type problem.
If additionally φ j are positive homogeneous and f0 = ∑mj=1 φ j then (33) represents
the variational formulation of the Arrow–Debreu model of economic equilibrium
(cf. [1, 28]). This variational inequality approach has been first introduced and
studied in the setting of reflexive, separable Banach spaces in [34].
5 Case φ j ≥ 0
In this section we improve the results of Proposition 4 by assuming that φ j ≥ 0.
For any ε > 0 introduce the data system on (X × R) × (X × R) by
f˜ j
ε
(τ, q) = f j (τ ) + ϕε(q), τ ∈ K, q ∈ R−
f˜0
ε
(y, z) = f0(y) + z + ind[ε,∞)(z), y ∈ K, z ∈ R+
φ˜ j
ε















where ϕε(q) = −ε(−q)1−ε + ind[−s,0](q), q ∈ R−, s > 0 is a positive constant with
s ∈ (0, 1m
)
.
Proposition 5 Assume that for each j = 1, . . . , m the hypotheses below hold:
(H1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j )) and ∀ y ∈ K \ {0} ∃β ≥ 0: βy ∈ Int(Dom( fj))
(H′2) ∃ ρ j > 0, ∃Mj > 0 :
{
τ ∈ K : 〈∂ f j (τ ), τ
〉 ∩ (R− + ρ j) = ∅
} ⊂ B(0, Mj)
(H′3) φ j(x) ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ K
(H4) ∂ fj(0) is locally compact
(H5) φ j : K → R+ is weakly continuous on K
(H′6) ∃ ρ > 0, ∃M > 0 : {y ∈ K : f0(y) ≤
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) + f0(0) + ρ} ⊂ B(0, M)
(H7)
(−∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0)
) ∩ ∂ f0(0) = ∅.
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j )) ∈ (K \ {0} × (K)m × (R+)m ×
(R+)m) such that









j ∈ ∂ f0(xε)
−〈xε, πεj























Proof Now we show that all the requirements of Proposition 4 are fulfilled when








Let us begin with (H3). It is easy to check that
φ˜ j
ε












ε > 0, ∀ (y, z) ∈ K × R+,
what desired.
To check that (H2) holds, let y ∈ ∂ f j (τ ) and z ∈ ∂ϕε(q). Hence z = ε(1 −














∂ f j (τ ), τ
〉
+ q[ε(1 − ε)(−qε)−ε − r] ≥
〈















∂ f j (τ ), τ
〉
.
Hence, by (H′2) it follows that ‖τ‖ ≤ Mj provided ε > 0 is small enough. The
boundedness of q ∈ [−s, 0] is obvious.
Concerning (H6), we wish to deduce that
⎧
⎨











is bounded. Notice that this set can be rewritten equivalently as
⎧
⎨
⎩(y, z) ∈ K × (R+ + ε) : f0(y) + z(1 − sm) ≤
m∑
j=1









So, by (H′6) we get ‖y‖ ≤ M. This in turn leads to
z ≤ 1











as desired. The remaining assumptions of Proposition 4 are obviously satisfied.
























−〈(xε, zε), (πεj , qεj
)〉 − φ˜ jε
(
xε, zε




























) = ε(1 − ε)( − qεj





〉 − φ j
(
xε) − zε(s + qεj
) + s
2





















From (40)1 it follows that −∑mj=1 qεj ≤ sm < 1. In view of (40)3 it is only possible
when zε = ε. Hence we obtain









, rεj ≥ 0,
(41)
which completes the proof. unionsq
Another version of this result is useful when studying economic equilibrium
problems. Namely, if we assume that Dom( f 0 ) ∩ (−K) is bounded and the cone K
is normal (for the characterization of normal cones we refer to [41]), i.e. there exists
ρ > 0 such that
‖τ + π‖ ≥ ρ(‖τ‖ + ‖π‖), ∀ τ, π ∈ K, (1) (42)
then in Proposition 5 the assumption (H1) can be considerably simplified and (H2) is
redundant. Namely, the following result is available.
1This condition is equivalent to the well known normality property ofK defined as the boundedness
of (BX (0, 1) +K) ∩ (BX (0, 1) −K) in X.
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Proposition 6 Suppose that K is normal and for any j = 1, . . . , m, the assumptions
below are fulf illed:
(H′1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j ))
(H′3) φ j(x) ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ K
(H4) ∂ fj(0) is locally compact
(H5) φ j : K → R+ is weakly continuous on K
(H′6) ∃ ρ > 0, ∃M > 0 : {y ∈ K : f0(y) ≤
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) + f0(0) + ρ} ⊂ B(0, M)
(H7)
(−∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0)
) ∩ ∂ f0(0) = ∅
(H8) Dom( f 0 ) ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C) for some C > 0.
Then for each ε > 0 there exists (xε, (πεj ), (α
ε
j )) ∈ K \ {0} × (K)m × (R+)m such that
(38) holds.
Proof Let R = C
ρm
+ 1 and f jR(·) := f j (·) + indB(0,R)(·), j = 1, . . . , m. It is easy to
show that f0, f jR and φ j satisfy all the hypotheses of Proposition 5. Indeed, since the




cides with the whole X. Consequently, (H1) and (H2) hold immediately while (H4)
is obviously fulfilled. Accordingly, by Proposition 5 there exists (xR, (π Rj ), (α
R
j ), ) ∈
K × (K)m × (R+)m, such that (38) holds with ∂ f j replaced by ∂ f jR.
Now, from (H8) it follows that ‖∑mj=1 π Rj ‖ ≤ C which by (42) implies that ‖π Rj ‖ ≤
C
ρm
. Hence ‖π Rj ‖ < R for each j = 1, . . . , m. Therefore the inclusion (38)2 takes the
form αRj x
R ∈ ∂ f jR(π Rj ) = ∂ f j (π Rj ), j = 1, . . . , m. But this means that (xR, (π Rj ), (αRj ))
is a solution of (38) in which only the basic data f0, fj, φ j are involved. unionsq
6 Economic Equilibrium Type Problem
Now we are going to study the behavior of (xε, (πεj ), (α
ε
j )) when ε → 0 in the
circumstances of Propositions 5 and 6.
Theorem 4 Assume that for each j = 1, . . . , m the hypotheses below hold:
(H1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j )) and ∀ y ∈ K \ {0} ∃β ≥ 0: βy ∈ Int(Dom( fj))
(H′2) ∃ ρ j > 0, ∃Mj > 0 :
{
τ ∈ K : 〈∂ f j (τ ), τ
〉 ∩ (R− + ρ j) = ∅
} ⊂ B(0, Mj)
(H′3) φ j(x) ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ K
(H4) ∂ fj(0) is locally compact
(H5) φ j : K → R+ is weakly continuous on K
(H′6) ∃ ρ > 0, ∃M > 0 : {y ∈ K : f0(y) ≤
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) + f0(0) + ρ} ⊂ B(0, M)
(H7)
(−∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0)
) ∩ ∂ f0(0) = ∅
(H9) f ∞j (y) + φ j(y) > 0, ∀ y ∈ K.
Then there exist disjoint J, J0 ⊂ {1, . . . , m} with J ∪ J0 = {1, . . . , m} and x ∈ K \ 0,
(πj) ∈ (K)m, (αj) j∈J ∈ Int(R+)|J|, (αj) j∈J0 = 0 ∈ (R+)|J0|, such that
πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx),
〈
x, πj
〉 + φ j(x) = 0, j ∈ J
πj ∈ ∂ fj(0),
〈
x, πj
〉 + φ j(x) ≥ 0, j ∈ J0
−
∑m






Proof To establish the result, Proposition 5 will be used. By the boundedness of {xε}
and {πεj } one can extract sequences {xεn} and {πεnj }, εn → 0 as n → ∞, such that
xεn ⇀ x weakly in X
π
εn
j ⇀ πj weakly in X
, j = 1, . . . , m.
Set J, J0, J∞ ⊂ {1, . . . , m} as follows
j ∈ J ⇔ lim
n→∞ α
εn
j = αj ∈ (0,∞)













〉 = 〈x, πj
〉
, j = 1, . . . , m. (44)
Taking into account (38)3 we get
〈
x, πj
〉 + φ j(x) = 0, j ∈ J ∪ J∞ (45)
〈
x, πj
〉 + φ j(x) ≥ 0, j ∈ J0. (46)
The maximal monotonicity of ∂ fj easily ensures (43) for j ∈ J ∪ J0.
It remains to show that J∞ = ∅. Recall that the recession functional f ∞j of fj is
defined by [9, 43]




fj(λy + y0), y ∈ X,
where y0 is an arbitrarily chosen element of Dom( fj). Consider the case α
εn
j → ∞, i.e.








≥ 〈y − αεnj xεn , πεnj
〉 ∀ y ∈ X.














































≥ f ∞j (x)
[9], passing to the limit with n → ∞ allows the conclusion
f ∞j (y) − f ∞j (x) ≥
〈
y − x, πj
〉 ∀ y ∈ X,
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or equivalently,
πj ∈ ∂ f ∞j (x).





which implies f ∞j (x) + φ j(x) = 0 in the contrary to (H9). So, J∞ = ∅, as de-
sired. Observe that (H7) ensures that x = 0. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
unionsq
Proceeding like in the proof of Proposition 6 one can formulate another version of
Theorem 4 in which Dom( f 0 ) ∩ (−K) is bounded and the cone K is normal. Then
(H1) can be weakened and replaced by (H′1). Moreover, (H
′
2) is redundant.
Theorem 5 Assume that K is normal, i.e. there exists ρ > 0 such that
‖τ + π‖ ≥ ρ(‖τ‖ + ‖π‖), ∀ τ, π ∈ K (47)
Moreover, assume that for each j = 1, . . . , m the hypotheses below hold:
(H′1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j ))
(H′3) φ j(x) ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ K
(H4) ∂ fj(0) is locally compact
(H5) φ j : K → R+ is weakly continuous on K
(H′6) ∃ ρ > 0, ∃M > 0 : {y ∈ K : f0(y) ≤
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) + f0(0) + ρ} ⊂ B(0, M)
(H7)
(−∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0)
) ∩ ∂ f0(0) = ∅
(H8) Dom( f 0 ) ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C) for some C > 0
(H9) f ∞j (y) + φ j(y) > 0, ∀ y ∈ K.
Then there exist disjoint J, J0 ⊂ {1, . . . , m} with J ∪ J0 = {1, . . . , m} and x ∈ K \ 0,
(πj) ∈ (K)m, (αj) j∈J ∈ Int(R+)|J|, (αj) j∈J0 = 0 ∈ (R+)|J0|, such that (43) holds.
7 Economic Equilibrium Problem
Throughout this chapter it will be assumed that K is normal, i.e., (42) holds, φ j ≥ 0




φ j(y) + indK(y), y ∈ K. (48)
Since f0 is positive homogeneous, lower semicontinuous and convex, there exists





, y ∈ X.
Under the foregoing assumptions (43) can be seen as the variational formulation
of the economic equilibrium problem as introduced in [34]. f0 characterizes the total
budget function while f j and φ j are dis-utility and budget functions corresponding
to j’s consumer, respectively. In (43), −πj ∈ −K, j = 1, . . . , m, and x ∈ K are the
commodity bundles and the price vector in the generalized Walrasian equilibrium,
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respectively. Equation (43)3 can be referred to as the market clearing condition
because for strictly positive price vector x the classical formulation of this condition
can be easily deduced (cf. [34]). Obviously, we shall be looking for nontrivial price
vector x, i.e., x = 0.
Unfortunately, Theorem 5 does not cover the case of economic equilibrium
problem as introduced above. Indeed, (48) does not imply (H′6). Moreover, due
to φ j(0) = 0 and f ∞j (0) = 0, condition (H9) cannot be satisfied. It must be also
emphasized that (H4) and (H5) are too strong in many important infinite dimensional
applications.
To overcome the aforementioned inconveniences we start our investigations with
the approximate model in which f0 is replaced by f
μ
0 where









+ indK(y), y ∈ X, μ > 0. (49)
Our main result of this section proceeds in several steps formulated in the form of
propositions.
First result in this direction is based on Proposition 5.
Proposition 7 Let K be normal. Moreover, assume that for each j = 1, . . . , m the
hypotheses below hold:
(H1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j )) and ∀ y ∈ K \ {0} ∃β ≥ 0: βy ∈ Int(Dom( fj))
(H′2) ∃ ρ j > 0, ∃Mj > 0 :
{
τ ∈ K : 〈∂ f j (τ ), τ
〉 ∩ (R− + ρ j) = ∅
} ⊂ B(0, Mj)
(H′′3 ) ∃γ j > 0 : φ j(y) ≥ γ j‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K
(H4) ∂ fj(0) is locally compact
(H5) φ j : K → R+ is weakly continuous on K
(H′10) 0 ∈ ∂ fj(0).
Then for each μ > 0 there exist
(
x, (πj), (αj)
) ∈ K \ {0} × (K)m × (R+)m
)
such that
πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx)
−
∑m









Proof First we check that under the foregoing assumptions, (H′6) of Proposition 5
is satisfied. By (H′′3 ) we get
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) ≥ γ ‖y‖, ∀ y ∈ K, γ =
∑m




)1+μ ≤ ∑mj=1 φ j(y) + ε we obtain the estimate ‖y‖ ≤ 1γ provided
that
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) ≤ 1. For
∑m





(1 + ε) 1ε
] ε
μ ≤ e
giving rise to ‖y‖ ≤ e
γ
, ε ∈ (0, μ], as required.
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To check that (H7) of Proposition 5 holds let us notice that ∂ f
μ
0 (0) ⊂ K. Assuming
that τ ∈ (−∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0)
) ∩ ∂ f μ0 (0) ⊂ (−K) ∩K = {0} we have τ =
∑m
j=1 τ j where
τ j ∈ ∂ fj(0) ⊂ K and ∑mj=1 τ j = 0. In view of (42) it follows that τ j = 0. Consequently,
0 ∈ ∂ fj(0) for each j = 1, . . . , m, in contrary to (H′10). Hence (H7) holds.
Since the remaining assumptions of Proposition 5 are satisfied immediately, there
exists
(




with xε = 0, such that





































Now we proceed to show the existence of a nontrivial solution x = 0 of (50). By
the boundedness argument we can suppose that for a subsequence εn → 0, there
exist x ∈ K and πj ∈ K with xεn ⇀ x weakly in X and πεnj ⇀ πj weakly in X,
j = 1, . . . , m.
First we claim that ‖xεn‖ ≥ δ for some positive δ > 0. Indeed, assuming on the
contrary that xεn → 0 strongly in X, by the maximal monotonicity of ∂ f μ0 we are led
to −∑mj=1 πj ∈ ∂ f μ0 (0) ⊂ K which implies πj = 0, j = 1, . . . , m.
Set x˜εn = xεn‖xεn ‖ , α˜εnj = ‖xεn‖αεnj .




























for sufficiently large n. Letting n → ∞ implies 12γ j ≤ 0. The contradiction.
Case α˜εnj → 0. In such a case we are led to 0 ∈ ∂ fj(0) which contradicts (H′10).
Case limn→∞ α˜εnj = α˜j ∈ (0,+∞) for each j = 1, . . . , m. From πεnj ∈ ∂ fj(α˜εnj x˜εn) we
get easily lim infn→∞
〈
x˜εn , πεnj
〉 ≥ 0 which leads to limn→∞
〈
x˜εn , πεnj
〉 = 0, j = 1, . . . , m.
Further on, according to (51)2 it follows


































On the other hand, by (51)3 and (51)4,




































Since α˜j > 0, so α
εn





which thanks to (H′′3 ) leads to






































Therefore, letting n → ∞ leads again to the contradiction 0 ≥ ∑mj=1 γ j. The proof of
the claim that ‖xεn‖ ≥ δ is complete.
The condition ‖xεn‖ ≥ δ allows to establish (50) by repeating the reasoning already
presented. Therefore the details will be omitted here. The proof of Proposition 7 is
complete. unionsq
Now we are ready to examine the case μ → 0.
Proposition 8 Let K be normal. Moreover, assume that for j = 1, . . . , m, the hy-
potheses below hold:
(H1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j )) and ∀ y ∈ K \ {0} ∃β ≥ 0: βy ∈ Int(Dom( fj))
(H′2) ∃ ρ j > 0, ∃Mj > 0 :
{
τ ∈ K : 〈∂ f j (τ ), τ
〉 ∩ (R− + ρ j) = ∅
} ⊂ B(0, Mj)
(H′′3 ) ∃γ j > 0 : φ j(y) ≥ γ j‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K
(H4) ∂ fj(0) is locally compact





) ∩  = ∅




) ∈ K \ {0} × (K)m × (R+)m and r ∈ (0, 1] such that
πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx), j = 1, . . . , m
−
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ r∂ f0(x)
−〈x, πj
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Proof By Proposition 7 we are allowed to suppose that for a sequence μn → 0 there
exists
(
xμn , (πμnj ), (α
μn
j )
) ∈ K \ {0} × (K)m × (R+)m
)
such that

























j ∈ ∂ f μn0 (xμn)
−〈xμn , πμnj










and xμn ⇀ x, πμnj ⇀ πj weakly in X and X
, respectively.
Consider two cases.
Case 1 ‖xμn‖ ≥ δ > 0. By (H′′3 ) we ensure the boundedness of (αμnj ) and therefore we
are allowed to assume that αμnj → αj ∈ R+, j = 1, . . . , m. The method that has been
already explained allows the conclusion limn→∞
〈
xμn , πμnj
〉 = 〈x, πj
〉
, j = 1, . . . , m,
which by the maximal monotonicity argument leads to −∑mj=1 πj ∈ ∂ f0(x) ⊂  and
πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx) for each j = 1, . . . , m. In view of (H′7) it follows that x = 0 and that




) ∈ K \ {0} × (K)m × (R+)m
)
fulfills (55) with r = 1.
Case 2 ‖xμn‖ → 0 as n → ∞. Introduce x˜μn = 1‖xμn ‖ xμn and α˜μnj = αμnj ‖xμn‖, j =
1, . . . , m. By the boundedness argument one can suppose that x˜μn ⇀ x˜ weakly in
X and (‖xμn‖)μn → r with r ∈ [0, 1].
The boundedness of (α˜μnj ) follows from the estimate
0 < γ j ≤ φ j(x˜μn) = −
〈
x˜μn , πμnj














Indeed, assuming that α˜μnj → +∞ as n → ∞ leads to





which thanks to (H1) implies the contradiction γ j ≤ 0. Therefore one can suppose
that α˜μnj → α˜j for each j = 1, . . . , m.




)1+μn − ( f0(x˜μn)
)1+μn] ≥
〈







, ∀ y ∈ K, (58)

























〉 ≥ 〈x˜, πj
〉
, j = 1, . . . , m.





〉 = 〈x˜, πj
〉
, j = 1, . . . , m. (60)
Thus maximal monotonicity of ∂ fj allows the conclusion that πj ∈ ∂ fj(α˜jx˜) j =
1, . . . , m.
Now passing to the limit in (58) leads to







, ∀ y ∈ K. (61)
Thus the existence of the desired x˜ and r has been established. It remains to show
that x˜ = 0 and r > 0.
Indeed, if r = 0 then −∑mj=1 πj ∈ K. On the other hand,
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ K which in
view ofK ∩ (−K) = {0} yields ∑mj=1 πj = 0 and consequently, becauseK is normal
we have πj = 0 for each j = 1, . . . , m. Thus 0 ∈ ∂ fj(α˜jx˜), j = 1, . . . , m, which by (H′10)
means that x˜ = 0 and α˜j > 0 for each j = 1, . . . , m. Further on, from (56)4 we get




which by passing to the limit leads to the contradiction γ j ≤ 0. This contradiction
ensures that r > 0.






for all y ∈ X which is
equivalent to − 1r
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ . But 0 ∈ , so −
∑m
j=1 ∂ fj(0)  −
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ r ⊂ 
in the contrary to (H′7). The claim follows.
Accordingly we arrive at (55)2. The validity of (55)3 is obvious in view of (H5) and
(60). This completes the proof of Proposition 8. unionsq
Remark 1 Since f 0 = ind the assumption (H8) of Proposition 6 takes the form
(H′8) ∃C > 0 :  ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C).
By proceeding like in the proof of Proposition 6 we arrive at the result.
Proposition 9 Let K be normal. Moreover, let for each j = 1, . . . , m, the hypotheses
below hold:
(H′1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j ))
(H′′3 ) ∃γ j > 0 : φ j(y) ≥ γ j‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K
(H4) ∂ fj(0) is locally compact
(H5) φ j : K → R+ is weakly continuous on K
(H′7)
(−∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0)
) ∩  = ∅
(H′8) ∃C > 0 :  ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C)




) ∈ K \ {0} × (K)m × (R+)m and r ∈ (0, 1] such that (55)
holds.
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Remark 2 Thanks to the positive homogeneity of φ j(·), j = 1, . . . , m, and f0(·) we
are allowed to suppose that x in Proposition 9 lies on a sphere with a radius c > 0
which may be specified arbitrarily when necessary.
Remark 3 The assumption (H′′3 ) is too restrictive in many applications. It can be
replaced by a weaker one
(H′′′3 ) ∃γ > 0 :
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) ≥ γ ‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K.
To have the Lagrange multipliers (αj) finite (i.e. αj < +∞) we shall need a weaker
version of (H9), namely
(H′9) φ j(y) + f ∞j (y) > 0 ∀ y ∈ K \ {0}.
We summarize foregoing remarks in the form of the following result.
Proposition 10 Let K be normal. Moreover, assume that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m} the
hypotheses below hold:
(H′1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j ))
(H′′′3 ) ∃γ > 0 :
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) ≥ γ ‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K
(H4) ∂ fj(0) is locally compact
(H5) φ j : K → R+ is weakly continuous on K
(H′7)
(−∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0)
) ∩  = ∅
(H′8) ∃C > 0 :  ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C)
(H′9) φ j(y) + f ∞j (y) > 0 ∀ y ∈ K \ {0}




) ∈ K × (K)m × (R+)m, ‖x‖ = 1, and r ∈ (0, 1] such that
πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx), j = 1, . . . , m
−
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ r∂ f0(x)
−〈x, πj





Proof To apply Proposition 9 replace φ j(·) by φεj (y) = φ j(y) + ε‖y‖, y ∈ K. Then
there exist
(
xε, (πεj ), (α
ε
j )
) ∈ K × (K)m × (R+)m, ‖xε‖ = 1 and rε ∈ (0, 1] such that
(55) holds, i.e.





j ∈ rε∂ f ε0 (xε)
−〈xε, πεj









where f ε0 (·) = f0(·) + mε‖·‖. By the boundedness we can assume that for a se-
quence εn → 0 as n → ∞, xεn ⇀ x and πεnj ⇀ πj weakly in X and X, respectively,
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and rεn → r. On the way already presented we arrive at limn→∞
〈
xεn , πεnj
〉 = 〈x, πj
〉
,
j = 1, . . . , m. Thus πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx) provided that j ∈ J =
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , m} : αεni → αi ∈
R+
}
. If j ∈ J∞ =
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , m} : αεni → +∞
}
then from





















, j = 1, . . . , m,
it results
0 ≥ φ j(x) + f ∞j (x). (64)
Moreover, passing to the limit in (63)2 yields







∀ y ∈ K. (65)
Now consider two possible cases.
Case 1 J∞ = ∅. This condition by (H′9) and (64) implies x = 0, and consequently,
πj ∈ ∂ fj(0) for each j ∈ J.
If r = 0 then from (65) we get −∑mj=1 πj ∈ K. Since
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ K, in view ofK ∩
(−K) = {0} it follows ∑mj=1 πj = 0 and consequently, (K is normal), πj = 0 for each
j = 1, . . . , m. Hence, 0 ∈ ∂ fj(0) for each j ∈ J which in view of (H′10) is impossible if
J is not empty. Thus J = ∅. But this implies that αεnj > 0 for sufficiently large n and








) + mεn = f0
(
xεn










Letting n → ∞ we are led to a contradiction γ ≤ 0.







) + rεn mεn = rεn f0
(
xεn










Passing to the limit as n → ∞ yields again the contradiction rγ ≤ 0.
Case 2 J∞ = ∅. In such a case our task is to show that x = 0 and r > 0. As already
established, πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx) for each j = 1, . . . , m, and (65) holds.
If r = 0 then it is easy to arrive at πj = 0, j = 1, . . . , m, which due to (H′10) makes
x = 0 and αj > 0 for each j = 1, . . . , m. But this is only possible when r = 1. The
contradiction.
If r > 0 and x = 0 then we get 0 ∈ r∂ f0(0) + ∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0) which contradicts (H′7)
because 0 ∈ r + ∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0) ⊂  +
∑m
j=1 ∂ fj(0).
The proof of Proposition 10 is complete. unionsq
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The assumption (H4) and (H5) seem to be too restrictive in many important
infinite dimensional applications. Now we show that the equality f0(·) = ∑mj=1 φ j(·)
makes this assumption redundant. Recall that φ j(·) has been assumed to be convex,
lower semicontinuous, positive homogeneous, nonnegative valued.
Now we are ready to formulate our main result concerning the economic equilib-
rium problem.
Theorem 6 Let X be a ref lexive Banach space and let K be normal. Moreover,
assume that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m} the hypotheses below hold:
(H′1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j ))
(H′′′3 ) ∃γ > 0 :
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) ≥ γ ‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K
(H4) ∂ f j(0) is locally compact
(H′7)
(−∑mj=1 ∂ fj(0)
) ∩  = ∅
(H′8) ∃C > 0 :  ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C)
(H′9) φ j(y) + f ∞j (y) > 0 ∀ y ∈ K \ {0}




) ∈ K × (K)m × (R+)m, ‖x‖ = 1, and r ∈ (0, 1] such that
πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx), j = 1, . . . , m
−
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ r∂ f0(x)
−〈x, πj





or equivalently, there exists x ∈ K, x = 0 and r ∈ (0, 1] such that
0 ∈ R(x) + r∂ f0(x).
Proof To show this result a method based on the finite intersection property will be
used (cf. [12]). Let  be the family of all finite dimensional subspaces of X, ordered
by inclusion. Let F ∈ , iF : F → X be the injection of F into X and iF : X → F
be its adjoint. Set f Fj = fj ◦ iF : F → R, j = 0, 1, . . . , m, KF = {y ∈ X : iF(y) ∈ K} =
K ∩ F, φFj = φ j ◦ iF : KF → R, j = 1, . . . , m. Since iF is surjective we get KF =
iF(K) where KF is the negative polar of KF . Set F = iF().
First we consider the case when (H′′′3 ) is replaced by (H
′′
3 ).
Notice that (H4) and (H5) are redundant in the setting of finite dimensional
spaces. From (42) it follows that ‖τ F + κ F‖F ≥ ρ(‖τ F‖F + ‖κ F‖F ) ∀τ F , κ F ∈ KF,
‖·‖F being the norm in F defined by ‖iF(τ )‖F = infκ∈Ker iF‖τ + κ‖, ∀τ ∈ X. This
allows to check that F ∩ (−KF) ⊂ BF (0, C) with the same constant C > 0 as in
(H′8) (not depending on F).
Further, set F0 ∈  “large” enough to fulfill the conditions: 0 ∈ ∂ f F0j (0), j =
1, . . . , m, and iF0
(∑m
j=1 ∂ fj(0) + 
) = 0 which is possible due to (H′10) and (H′7),
respectively.
Without loss of generality we can suppose that iF(∂ fj(0)) = ∂ f Fj (0)), j = 1, . . . , m,
F ∈ . Indeed, following the technique of Proposition 9 we can suppose that Dom f j ,
j = 1, . . . m, are bounded which implies that Dom fj = X, j = 1, . . . , m, and the
assertion follows.
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Now, if we denote by F0 the set of all finite dimensional subspaces of X contain-
ing F0 then for each F ∈ F0 all the assumptions of Proposition 9 are fulfilled. Conse-





















) ∈ ∂ f Fj (0),
〈




















fj(y) − fj(αFj xF) ≥
〈
y − αFj xF , π Fj
〉
∀ y ∈ F, αFj > 0




∀ y ∈ F, αFj = 0
f0(y) − f0(xF) ≥
〈







∀ y ∈ F.
〈





) = 0, αFj > 0
〈










By (H′8) and (42) we can suppose that {π Fj }F∈F0 is bounded in X. The boundedness
of {(αFJ )}F∈F0 follows from (H′′3 ). Recall that {xF}F∈F0 lies on the unit sphere and






















, F ∈ F0
is contained in the closed ball BX×(X)m×Rm+×R(0, R) of X × (X)m × Rm+ × R with the
radius R not depending on F ∈ F0 . Since BX×(X)m×Rm+×R(0, R) is weakly compact







is not empty, say
(








Let z ∈ X be arbitrarily given. Choose F ∈ F0 containing x and z. Taking into
account (69) we are allowed to extract a sequence
(






that xFn ⇀ x weakly in X, π Fnj ⇀ πj weakly in X
, (αFnj ) → (αj) in Rm and rFn → r in
R as n → ∞.




xFn , π Fnj
〉 = 〈x, πj
〉
, j = 1, . . . , m. (70)
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Now letting n → ∞ in (68) leads to
fj(z) − fj(αjx) ≥
〈
z − αjx, πj
〉
, αj > 0




, αj = 0











Since z ∈ X has been chosen arbitrarily,
fj(z) − fj(αjx) ≥
〈
z − αjx, πj
〉
, ∀ z ∈ K.






, ∀ z ∈ K, (72)
i.e. πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx), j = 1, . . . , m, and −∑mj=1 πj ∈ r∂ f0(x).
We claim that x = 0 and r > 0.
Indeed, if r = 0 then from (72)2 it follows that −∑mj=1 πj ∈ K. On the other
hand,
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ K which in view of K ∩ (−K) = {0} yields
∑m
j=1 πj = 0 and conse-
quently, πj = 0 for each j = 1, . . . , m (K is normal). Thus 0 ∈ ∂ fj(αjx), j = 1, . . . , m,
which by (H10) means that x = 0 and αj > 0 for each j = 1, . . . , m. Further on, from
(68)3 we get





xFn , π Fnj
〉
which by passing to the limit leads to the contradiction γ j ≤ 0. This contradiction
ensures that r > 0.






for all z ∈ K , which is
equivalent to − 1r
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ . But 0 ∈ , so −
∑m
j=1 ∂ fj(0)  −
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ r ⊂ 
in the contrary to (H′7). The assertion follows.
Since f0 is weakly lower semicontinuous, lim infn→∞ f0(xFn) ≥ f0(x). But from






Taking into account that f0(·) = ∑mj=1 φ j(·) and that each of φ j(·)’s is weakly lower
semicontinuous, we obtain limn→∞ φ j(xFn) = φ j(x), j = 1, . . . , m. Having in mind
(70), thanks to (68)4−5 we are led to (62)3. Summing up, with the use of (H′′3 ) we
have established (62). It must be emphasized that (H5) has not been applied in the
aforementioned procedure.
In the last step we return to (H′′′3 ). The idea is to consider the regularization
φ j(·) + ε‖·‖, ε > 0, instead of φ j(·). Then for sufficiently small ε > 0 the existence
of
(





, ‖xε‖ = 1, follows such that





j ∈ rε∂ f ε0 (xε)
−〈xε, πεj










where f ε0 (·) = f0(·) + εm‖·‖. By the boundedness arguments we can assume that for
a sequence εn → 0 as n → ∞, xεn ⇀ x and πεnj ⇀ πj weakly in X and X, respec-






, j = 1, . . . , m. Thus πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx) provided that j ∈ J =
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , m} : αεni →
αi ∈ R+
}
. If j ∈ J∞ =
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , m} : αεni → +∞
}
then from





















, j = 1, . . . , m,
it results
0 ≥ φ j(x) + f ∞j (x). (74)
Moreover, passing to the limit in (73)3 yields







∀ y ∈ K. (75)
Proceeding analogously as in the proof of Proposition 10 we establish (62)1−2 with
x = 0 and r > 0.


















) = φ j(x), j = 1, . . . , m.
Having in mind (70), thanks to (73)3 we are led to (62)3. This completes the proof of
Theorem 6. unionsq
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Theorem 6,
(
x, (πj), r
) ∈ K × (K)m × (0, 1] is
a solution of the following economic equilibrium problem:
Find πj ∈ K, j = 1, . . . , m, and x ∈ K, ‖x‖ = 1, such that
f j (πj) = inf
{
f j (τ ) : −
〈
x, τ
〉 ≤ φ j(x) and τ ∈ K
}
, j = 1, . . . , m
∑m












If for each j = 1, . . . , m the inequality constraints −〈x, τ 〉 ≤ φ j(x) hold as equalities
then r = 1.
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In the case ∂ fj(0) = ∅, j = 1, . . . , m, from Theorem 6 we get the result.
Corollary 2 Let K be normal. Moreover, assume that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m} the
hypotheses below hold:
(H′1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j ))
(H′′′3 ) ∃γ > 0 :
∑m
j=1 φ j(y) ≥ γ ‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K
(H′8) ∃C > 0 :  ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C)
(H′9) φ j(y) + f ∞j (y) > 0 ∀ y ∈ K \ {0}




) ∈ K × (K)m × Int(Rm+), ‖x‖ = 1, such that
πj ∈ ∂ fj(αjx), j = 1, . . . , m
−
∑m
j=1 πj ∈ ∂ f0(x)
〈
x, πj





Moreover, πj ∈ K, j = 1, . . . , m, and x ∈ K, ‖x‖ = 1, are solutions of the problem
f j (πj) = inf
{
f j (τ ) : −
〈
x, τ
〉 ≤ φ j(x) and τ ∈ K
}
, j = 1, . . . , m
∑m










If (H′′′3 ) is replaced by (H
′′
3 ) then (H
′
9) is redundant and the following result
follows.
Corollary 3 Let K be normal. Moreover, assume that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m} the
hypotheses below hold:
(H′1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j ))
(H′′3 ) ∃γ j > 0 : φ j(y) ≥ γ j‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K
(H′8) ∃C > 0 :  ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C)




) ∈ K × (K)m × Int(Rm+), ‖x‖ = 1, such that (76) holds.
Remark 4 In Theorem 6, if (H′9) does not hold for some j ∈ {1, . . . , m} then there
might happen that φ j(x) = −
〈
x, πj
〉 = 0 and αj = +∞ (cf. [34]). This is a warning
signal for j’s consumer that the bankruptcy may occur.
8 Constrained Multiobjective Optimization Problem
In this section some existence results for a class of multiobjective optimization prob-
lems with “budget-like” constraints will be established. For any β = (βj) ∈ Int Rm
define






, y ∈ K, j = 1, . . . , m.
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It is easy to see that







One can check immediately that if f0, fj, φ j fulfill the assumptions of Corollary 3
then for the data system ( f0, f
β
j , φ j) all these assumptions are fulfilled as well.
Accordingly, the result follows.
Proposition 11 Assume that K is normal. Moreover, suppose that for each j =
1, . . . , m, the hypotheses below hold:
(H′1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j ))
(H′′3 ) ∃γ j > 0 : φ j(y) ≥ γ j‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K
(H′8) ∃C > 0 :  ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C)
(H′10) ∂ fj(0) = ∅.
Then for each β ∈ (Int R+)m there exists
(
xβ, (πβj ), (α
β
j )
































j = 1, . . . , m. (77)























































































, ∀ (τ j) ∈ (K)m, −
∑m






Define a mapping  : Int(Rm+) → 2Rm by assigning to each β ∈ Int(Rm+) the set of
all corresponding Lagrange multipliers, i.e.
(β) := {(αβj






















)) ∈ (K × (K)m) with f0
(
xβ
) = c}. (79)
Here c is a positive constant which can be arbitrarily specified thanks to the positive
homogeneity of φ j and f0 = ∑mj=1 φ j. Note that (·) has nonempty, compact values,
but it is not convex valued.
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Our aim now is to examine the conditions under which  has at least one fixed
point. Notice, that if  happens to have a fixed point, say β, the corresponding xβ is
















fj(y) + f0(y) ∀y ∈ K (80)
with the “budget-like” constraints
−〈xβ, πβj
〉 − φ j
(
xβ
) = 0, j = 1, . . . , m. (81)
It is easy to observe that in such a case xβ is a Pareto optimal solution of a
multiobjective optimization problem related to the vector objective ( f0, f1, . . . , fm).
Moreover, the validity of “budget-like” constraints (81) is ensured.
Proposition 12 Under the assumptions of Proposition 11 and
(H11) ∂ f j (0) = ∅,
there exist σ, S ∈ Int Rm+ with σ j < S j, j = 1, . . . , m, such that





) ∈ [σ, S], (82)
where [σ, S] = {(t j) : σ j ≤ t j ≤ S j, j = 1, . . . , m}, i.e. 
([σ, S]) ⊂ [σ, S].














, xβ = 0,
be a solution of (77). Since f0, φ j are positive homogeneous, one can suppose that
‖xβ‖ = c > 0
for some fixed c > 0 which will be specified later.
Since f j is convex, proper and lower semicontinuous, there exist a j, b j ≥ 0 with
f j (τ ) ≥ −a j − b j‖τ‖, ∀τ ∈ Dom( f j ). (83)





Now we claim that for each S = (S j) ∈ Int Rm+ there exists σS = (σSj), σSj > 0,
such that





) ∈ [σS,∞). (85)
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On the contrary, suppose that for some j ∈ {1, . . . , m} there exists σ nj → 0 as n → ∞,




j . Thus α
βn















→ r, as n → ∞, r ∈ [0, 1].
Now consider two possible cases: 1) r = 0 and 2) r ∈ (0, 1].






n → 0, strongly in X.




j ⇀ πˆj weakly
in X for some πˆj ∈ X. Since βnj πβ
n





, thanks to the maximal
monotonicity of ∂ fj it follows that πˆj ∈ ∂ fj(0), in contrary to (H′10).
2) If r ∈ (0, 1], then βnj → 0. By the boundedness of the corresponding xβn and
π
βn











⇀ rx weakly in X for












thanks to the maximal monotonicity of ∂ f j it follows that rx ∈ ∂ f j (0), in contrary
to (H11). The claim has been established.
From now on, fix S j = S, j = 1, . . . , m, with S ≥ 2. For simplicity of notations we
use the same symbol S for the vector (S, . . . , S). As already established, there exists
σS corresponding to S such that
βj ∈ [σSj, S] =⇒ αβj ∈ [σSj,∞), j = 1, . . . , m. (86)
Using (77)1 we get
α
β






〉 + f j
(
βjτ






≤ αβj ‖xβ‖‖τ‖ + f j
(
βjτ
) + a j + b jβj‖πβj ‖
≤ αβj c‖τ‖ + f j
(
βjτ





{γ j}, which is valid for any τ ∈ K and β ∈ Int Rm+ . Substituting τ ∈ K with
















f j (t jτ) : ‖τ‖ ≤
γˆ
2
, σSj ≤ t j
}}
.






c ≤ dSj + a j + b jβj C
μm−1
, ∀βj ∈ [σSj, S] (87)



















dSj + a j) + S 2Ccγˆ μm−1
m∑
j=1
b j ∀β ∈ [σS, S].
Now we are ready to choose c > 0 in such a way to fulfill the desired condition























j ≤ 1 +
1
2
S ≤ S, (89)
because S ≥ 2. The proof of Proposition 12 is complete. unionsq
Proposition 13 Under the assumptions of Proposition 12 the mapping  has at least
one f ixed point.




in X × (X)m we
conclude that  has compact, nonempty values and it is closed in the sense that
whenever βn → β as n → ∞ then each cluster point of {αβn} ⊂ (βn) lies in (β).
Therefore, a function  : [σ, S] × [σ, S] → R given by
(β, α) = min
α˜∈(β)
〈
β − α˜, β − α〉
Rm




stands for the inner product in Rm, is concave with respect to α (fixed
β) and lower semicontinuous as a function of β (fixed α). By the Ky Fan inequality
[8] there exists βˆ ∈ [σ, S] with the property that
(βˆ, α) ≤ (α, α) = 0, ∀α ∈ [σ, S], (91)
This implies the existence of αβˆ ∈ (βˆ) such that αβˆ = βˆ, i.e. βˆ ∈ [σS, S] is a fixed
point of . The proof is complete. unionsq
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, ∀ (τ j
) ∈ (K)m, −
∑m






In other words, a multiobjective optimization problem with “budget-like” con-
straints (related to the vector objective ( f0, f1, . . . , fm) and the “budget functions”
(φ1, . . . , φm)) admits at least one Pareto optimal solution.
Now we are ready to formulate the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 7 Assume that K is normal and f0(y) = ∑mj=1 φ j(y), y ∈ K, where φ j(·)
are convex, lower semicontinuous, positive homogeneous, nonnegative valued. Sup-
pose that for each j = 1, . . . , m the hypotheses below hold:
(H′1) 0 ∈ cl(Dom( f j ))
(H′′3 ) ∃γ j > 0 : φ j(y) ≥ γ j‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K
(H′8) ∃C > 0 :  ∩ (−K) ⊂ B(0, C)
(H13) ∃G > 0 : ∑mj=1 φ j(y) ≤ G‖y‖ ∀ y ∈ K.
Moreover, let one of the two assumptions below hold:







< 0, j=1,. . . ,m.
Then there exist (xβ, (πβj ), (βj)) such that (92) and (93) hold.
Proof The case (H′′10) has been already considered in Proposition 14.
Suppose that (H12) is satisfied. Fix any ε ∈ (0, 1) and introduce the data system on
(X × R) × (X × R) by
f˜ j
ε
(τ, q) = f j (τ ) + ϕε(q), τ ∈ K, q ∈ R−
f˜0
ε
(y, z) = f0(y) + z, y ∈ K, z ∈ R+
φ˜ j
ε
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where ϕε(q) = −ε(−q)1−ε and s j > 0 are a positive constants with ∑mj=1 s j = 1. Note
that ∂ f˜ j
ε
(0, 0) = ∅ and ∂( f˜ j
ε
)(0, 0) = ∅. The remaining assumptions of Proposition
14 hold as well. Therefore, for sufficiently large c there exists
(



































〉 − φ j(xs) − zs(s j + qsj) = 0. (95)

















≤ −ρ, j = 1, . . . , m




(s j + qsj) ≤ 1 −
ρ
βsj
from which it follows
−zs
(
s j + qsj
)
≤ φ j(xs) − ρ
βsj





Adding by sides these inequalities (recall that
∑m
j=1 s j = −
∑m
j=1 q j = 1) yields







































, j = 1, . . . m. (97)
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Accordingly, it has been shown that for a convex, closed set Q given by
Q =
{








s j = 1
}
the implication holds





Following the lines of the proof of Proposition 13 we assert that the mapping S which
assigns to any s ∈ Q the set of all corresponding qs’s, i.e. S(s) = {qs}, is closed and
compact valued. Moreover, if Q  sn → s ∈ Q as n → ∞, then each cluster point of
{qsn} lies in S(s). Again, by the Ky Fan inequality the existence of a fixed point of S
is ensured. By (95)3 we arrive at the desired conclusion. The proof is complete. unionsq
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